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This paper investigates the empirical relevance of a new framework for monetary policy 
analysis in which the decision-makers are allowed to weight differently positive and negative 
deviations of inflation and output from the target values. Reduced-form and structural 
estimates of the central bank first order condition indicate that the preferences of the Fed have 
been highly asymmetric only before 1979, with the response to output contractions being 
larger than the response to output expansions of the same magnitude. This asymmetry is 
shown to induce an average inflation bias of 1.11% that appears to have substantially 
contributed to the great inflation of the 1960s and 1970s. 
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A popular method of monetary model building is to regard policy interventions as the solution
of an optimal control problem in which the central bank minimizes some quadratic criterion
subject to a linear structure of the economy. The quadratic characteristic of the objective
and the linear feature of the constraints give rise to a linear ﬁrst order condition that de-
scribes the optimal response of the central bank to the developments in the economy. While
the quadratic speciﬁcation implies that the monetary authorities evenly weight positive and
negative deviations of inﬂation and output from the target values, such a modeling choice has
been questioned by several practitioners at the policy committees of various central banks on
the ground that it has little justiﬁcation beyond analytical tractability.1
Blinder (1997, p. 6) argues that ’academic macroeconomists tend to use quadratic loss func-
tions for reason of mathematical convenience, without thinking much about their substantive
implications. The assumption is not innocuous, [...] practical central bankers and academics
would beneﬁt from more serious thinking about the functional form of the loss function’. De-
scribing his experience as Fed vice-Chairman Blinder (1998, pp. 19-20) pushes the argument
even further and claims ’in most situations the central bank will take far more political heat
when it tightens pre-emptively to avoid higher inﬂation than when it eases pre-emptively to
avoid higher unemployment’, suggesting that political pressures can induce asymmetric cen-
tral bank interventions. Similar concerns appear to emerge also at other central banks like the
ECB and in the occasion of an interest rate cut of 50 point basis Duisenberg (2001) states ’the
maintenance of price stability remains our ﬁrst priority. [...] today’s action could be taken
”without prejudice to price stability”, and it thereby supported the other goals of EMU, such
as economic growth’.
On the theoretical side, a number of recent studies explore some novel mechanisms through
which the costs of the business cycle can be asymmetric. Persson and Tabellini (1999) combine
retrospective voting with imperfect information about the incumbent’s talent to show that
career concerned politicians can make reappointment more likely by endowing the central bank
with an asymmetric objective that requires a larger monetary policy response in periods of
1Notable exceptions include Rotemberg and Woodford (1999) and Woodford (2003, ch. 6), who show that
the quadratic form can be obtained as a second order approximation of the representative agent’s utility.
2poor economic performance.2 Galí, Gertler and Lopez-Salido (2003a) construct a theoretical
measure of welfare gap that is based on price and wage markups, and ﬁnd that the costs of
output ﬂuctuations for the US have been historically large and asymmetric. Erosa and Ventura
(2002) introduce transaction costs and heterogeneity in portfolio holdings in an otherwise
neo-classical model and show that these frictions can make the costs of inﬂation variation
asymmetric. Lastly, the psychology of choice reveals that people tend to place a greater weight
on the prospect of losses than on the prospect of gains in decision making under uncertainty
(see Kahneman and Tversky, 1979), suggesting that also policy makers, who aggregate over
individual welfare, may be loss-averse.
On the empirical side, only a few studies, developed independently, estimate an asymmetric
reaction function. Cukierman and Muscatelli (2003), and Martin and Milas (2004) show
some international evidence that supports the notion of a nonlinear interest rate rule. Ruge-
Murcia (2003), and Cukierman and Gerlach (2003) adopt an inﬂation rate reaction function
that is nonlinear in either inﬂation or the output gap, and they favor the hypothesis of an
asymmetric objective for some OECD economies. Dolado, Maria-Dolores and Ruge-Murcia
(2004) estimate an interest rate rule that is asymmetric in inﬂation only, and they ﬁnd evidence
of nonlinearity after 1983 for the US.
Despite the increasing number of empirical works, no study quantiﬁes - to our knowledge
- the average inﬂation bias that is associated with asymmetric preferences and no study
assesses its possible contribution to the great inﬂation of the 1960s and 1970s. The present
paper attempts to ﬁll this gap. The speciﬁcation of a potentially asymmetric loss function
generates the testable prediction that the monetary authorities respond non-linearly to the
deviations of inﬂation and the output from the target values. A main result of the paper is
that nonlinearity is a robust feature of US monetary policy rules only before 1979 and with
respect to the output gap. According to the model, these estimates imply an average inﬂation
bias of 1.11% during the 1960s and 1970s but a value not statistically diﬀerent from zero over
the last two decades. Another main result is that a shift over sub-samples in the inﬂation
bias accounts for a larger fraction of the decline in the averge inﬂation than a reduction in the
Fed’s implicit inﬂation target. Hence, asymmetric preferences seem to provide an alternative
2De Long (1997) forcefully argues that US monetary policy during the 1970s was highly sensitive to the
political pressures for a higher money growth and lower interest rates, and provides extensive narrative evidence
about the inﬂuence of Nixon’s administration on the Chairmanship of Arthur Burns at the Fed.
3explanation for the US great inﬂation.
The road map of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the model and derives the
i n t e r e s tr a t er u l ea st h eﬁrst order condition of the central bank optimization problem. Section
3 reports the estimates of both the policy rule coeﬃcients and the preference parameters, and
conducts a robustness analysis. The following section shows that asymmetric preferences on
the output gap induce an average inﬂation bias, and proposes a simple strategy to decompose
the actual inﬂation mean into a target and a bias argument. Section 5 concludes.
2 Theoretical model
Following Svensson (1999), the policy rule is modeled as the outcome of an intertemporal
optimization problem in which the decision makers minimize a given criterion subject to the
constraints provided by the structure of the economy. The optimizing device allows us to
back out the objectives of the monetary authorities, which are unobserved, from the observed
path of policy rates implying that evidence on the latter can be interpreted as informative
about the former. Since our identiﬁcation strategy relies on the estimation of a model-based
speciﬁcation for the reaction function, we challenge the assumption of symmetric preferences
in the context of a popular framework for monetary policy analysis. This is a version of the
New-Keynesian model of the business cycle derived in Yun (1996), and Woodford (2003, chs.
3 and 4), among many others.3
2.1 The structure of the economy
This subsection describes an aggregate, log-linearized version of the New-Keynesian forward-
looking model with sticky prices that has been recently summarized by Clarida, Galí and
Gertler (1999). The evolution of the economy is represented by the following two-equation
system:
πt = θEtπt+1 + kyt + εs
t (1)
yt = Etyt+1 − ϕ(it − Etπt+1)+εd
t (2)
Equation (1) captures the staggered feature of a Calvo-type world in which each ﬁrm
adjusts its price with a constant probability in any given period, and independently from the
3Surico (2003) shows that both the theoretical and the empirical results obtained here using a New-Kynesian
model are robust to the speciﬁcation of a Lucas aggregate supply curve as the structure of the economy.
4time elapsed from the last adjustment. The discrete nature of price setting creates an incentive
to adjust prices by more the higher is the future inﬂation expected at time t.T h ei n ﬂation
level is πt whereas the output gap is denoted by yt and captures the movements in marginal
costs associated with variations in excess demand. For analytical convenience, the aggregate
supply curve is assumed purely forward-looking. Galí and Gertler (1999), Ireland (2001), Galí,
Gertler and Lopez-Salido (2003b), and Smets and Wouters (2003a) provide empirical support
for this choice as a good ﬁrst approximation to the dynamics of US inﬂation.
Equation (2) is a standard Euler equation for consumption combined with the relevant
market clearing condition. It basically brings the notion of consumption smoothing into an
aggregate demand formulation by making the output gap a positive function of its future value
and a negative function of the real interest rate, it−Etπt+1.L a s t l y ,εs
t and εd
t are respectively
cost and demand disturbances that obey an autoregressive, mean reverting process.
2.2 An asymmetric speciﬁcation of the loss function
The policy actions are taken before the realization of the economic shocks and thus the
central bank sets the interest rate at the beginning of period t on the basis of the information








where δ is the discount factor and L stands for the period loss function.
Our framework departures from the conventional quadratic set up in that policy makers are
allowed, but not required, to treat diﬀerently positive and negative deviations of inﬂation and
output from the target. Indeed, the quadratic form may approximate reasonably well a number
of diﬀerent functions and in the absence of a rigorous theoretical foundation any speciﬁc
nonquadratic proposal is destined to be unsatisfactory against the wide range of plausible
alternatives. Nevertheless, a modeling choice is required and for the sake of concreteness we
specify Lt as follows:
Lt =
e[α(πt−π∗)] − α(πt − π∗) − 1
α2 + λ
"








The coeﬃcients λ and µ represent the central bank’s aversion towards output ﬂuctuations
around potential and towards interest rate level ﬂuctuations around the target i∗.T h ep r e f -
5erence over inﬂation stability is normalized to one so that λ and µ are expressed in relative
terms. The inﬂation target is π∗ whereas the parameters α and γ capture any possible asym-
metry in the loss function. Varian (1974) and Zellner (1986) proposed a linex speciﬁcation
similar to (4) in the context of Bayesian econometric analysis while Nobay and Peel (2003)
introduced this form in the optimal monetary policy literature.4
A negative value of γ implies that, everything equals, an output contraction relative to the
potential level is weighted more severely than an output expansion of the same magnitude. To
see this notice that whenever yt < 0 the exponential component of the loss function dominates
the linear component while the converse is true for yt > 0. A similar reasoning holds for the
coeﬃcient α. However, if the monetary authorities are more concerned about overshooting
π∗ rather than undershooting it, the value of α would be positive meaning that high inﬂation
relative to the target is more costly than low inﬂation. It should be noted that while these sign
predictions seem plausible given the sample we use, the linex speciﬁcation does not prevent
α to be negative corresponding to a case in which the risk of deﬂation outweighs the risk
of inﬂation. Figure 1 compares the standard quadratic with the linex function for both the
inﬂation (panel a) an the output (panel b) objective.
The linex function nests the quadratic form as a special case so that when both α and γ go









latter can be obtained as a second order approximation of the utility-based welfare function in
a New-Keynesian model of the business cycle that involves a zero lower bound for the nominal
interest rate (see Woodford, 2003, ch. 6). It follows that under the null of a quadratic
loss, the policy preferences are functions of some primitive parameters of the model and
therefore potential evidence of asymmetries in the central bank objective may be interepreted
as evidence of asymmetries in the representative agent’s utility. The implication is that
business cycle ﬂuctuations may have important welfare eﬀects beyond the second order.
2.3 A nonlinear policy rule
We solve for the optimal monetary policy under discretion. Because no endogenous state vari-
able enters the model, the intertemporal problem reduces to a sequence of static optimization
4Additional references include Chadha and Schellekens (1999), Ruge-Murcia (2003) and Surico (2003).
6problems. This amounts to choosing in each period the instrument it such as to minimize:
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subject to πt = kyt +ft and yt = −ϕit +gt,w h e r eFt ≡ Et−1
P∞
τ=1 δτLt+τ, ft ≡ θEtπt+1 +εs
t
and gt ≡ Etyt+1 + ϕEtπt+1 + εd
t are taken as given reﬂecting the fact that the monetary











λϕ + µ(it − i∗)=0 (5)
and it implicitly describes the optimal, possibly nonlinear response of the central bank to the
developments in the economy. Equation (5) nests the linear form as a special case and when
both α and γ tend to zero the reaction function collapses to an implicit interest rate rule of
the type analyzed in Rudebusch (2002), and Clarida, Galí and Gertler (2000):
−kϕEt−1 (πt − π∗) − λϕEt−1 (yt)+µ(it − i∗)=0
This feature is attractive as it implies that the hypothesis of symmetric central bank
preferences can be tested simply by evaluating the functional form of the reaction function.
3 Empirical results
This section reports the estimates and the relevant tests of the targeting rule. The analysis
is conducted on US quarterly data spanning the period 1960:1-2003:2. The data set has been
obtained in July 2003 from the web site of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis and embodies
alternative measures of inﬂation and output gap. In the baseline case, inﬂation is measured
as the changes in the log of the personal consumption expenditure (PCE) deﬂator while the
output gap is constructed using the series of potential output provided by the Congressional
Budget Oﬃce (CBO). Figure 2 plots the baseline series. As a way to provide a robustness
check, we also report the results for two alternative measures of inﬂation and output gap,
namely the GDP deﬂator and the Hodrick-Prescott ﬁltered real GDP.5
5The use of a low frequency ﬁlter to obtain estimates of the target level of real activities does not contrast
with the model-based deﬁnition of ﬂexible-price level of output. As argued by Woodford (2003, ch. 7), the
central bank can make society better oﬀ by accommodating technology and preference shocks while oﬀsetting
disturbances to inﬂation and wage mark-ups. In this vein, Smets and Wouters (2003b) show that if the monetary
authorities wish to hedge against shocks of unknown nature, they would regard persistent disturbances as the
7We divide the full sample around the third quarter of 1979 which corresponds to the
appointment of Paul Volcker as Fed Chairman. This lines up with a number of empirical
studies that demonstrate a signiﬁcant diﬀerence in the way monetary policy was conducted
pre- and post-1979 (see Clarida, Galí and Gertler, 2000, and Favero and Rovelli, 2003 among
many others). Moreover, we remove from the second sub-sample the period 1979:3-1982:3
when, as documented by Bernanke and Mihov (1998), the operating procedure of the Fed
temporarily switched from federal funds rate to non-borrowed reserves targeting.
We estimate a version of the central bank Euler equation using the Generalized Method of
Moments (GMM) with an optimal weighting matrix that accounts for possible heteroskedas-
ticity and serial correlation in the error terms (see Hansen, 1982). In practice, we employ a
four lag Newey-West estimate of the covariance matrix. Starting from date t−1,f o u rl a g so f
the explanatory variables, the federal funds rates and the measure of inﬂation left out from
the regression are included as instruments corresponding to a set of 19 overidentifying restric-
tions that can be tested for. The null hypothesis of valid overidentifying restrictions is never
rejected. Moreover, the multiple endogenous regressor analog of the F-statistics from the ﬁrst
stage regression is always close to (and exceeds in most cases) the critical value that ensures
that the bias is no more than 10% of the inconsistency of OLS (see Stock and Yogo, 2003).
Given the conservative nature of the test, we consider reliable the GMM inference.
3.1 Preliminary Analysis
The nonlinear terms in (5) stem from asymmetric central bank preferences but we cannot ex-
clude in principle that some alternative source like a nonlinear Phillips curve might also return
evidence of asymmetry in the policy rule (see Schaling, 1999). A simple way to discriminate
between nonquadratic objectives and nonlinear constraints is to perform the REgression Spec-
iﬁcation Error Test (RESET), which is designed to detect incorrect functional forms, on the
New-Keynesian Phillips curve. To this end, we estimate equation (1) over the full sample
using Instrumental Variables and a twelve-lag Newey-West variance covariance matrix. The
set of instruments dated at time t−1 includes four lags of the GDP deﬂator inﬂation, the CBO
only shocks aﬀecting the target level of output. When applied to an estimated New-Keynesian model for the
Euro area, they ﬁnd that the counterfactual ﬂexible-price level of output, which is the one responding to all
non-monetary shocks in the economy, is indeed extremely volatile, whereas the target level of output, which is
the one only aﬀected by supply and demand disturbances, actually follows a relatively smooth path.
8output gap, the long-short interest rate spread, and the PCE inﬂation. When the squared,
and then the squared and the cubes of the predictions ˆ πt are added to the original equation,
the corresponding F-tests show that the null hypothesis of non-misspeciﬁcation is not rejected.
This suggests that the US aggregate supply curve is well approximated by a linear relation,
consistently with the ﬁndings in Dolado, Maria-Dolores and Ruge-Murcia (2004).
An additional form of nonlinearity comes from the policy makers’ (mis)perception of the
state of the economy. Suppose that on the basis of the estimates available in real-time the
Fed believed for part of the sample that the output gap was larger than the revised data
indicates. Then, the policy interventions during that period may appear surprisingly activist
given the values of the gap from the 2003 vintage. However, using real-time data Orphanides
(2004) ﬁnds that the Fed response to the output gap was actually more activist in the 1970s
when the misperceptions on potential output turned out to be more severe. Moreover, Kuha
and Temple (2003) show that measurement error in quadratic regressions tends to hide the
presence of nonlinearities. In the view of these arguments, this paper takes an essential step
towards asymmetric preferences by extending the available evidence on monetary policy rules
using revised data.
A further reason for nonlinearity is associated with the point estimates of the natural
rate of real activity. Meyer, Swanson and Wieland (2001) show that in periods of heightened
uncertainty about the NAIRU, the central bank may face an incentive to move policy rates
only for suﬃciently large deviations of unemployment from the target. While potentially
relevant, this hypothesis testing would require a real-time series for potential output such as
to reﬂect the policy makers’ beliefs about the state of the economy at the time decisions were
taken. For reasons discussed above, however, we use the oﬃcial estimates of potential output,
w h i c ha r ea c t u a l l yr e v i s e db yt h eC B Oo nar e g u l a rb a s i s .A st h e s er e v i s i o n ss e n s i b l yr e d u c e
the uncertainty about the historical measures of the output gap, this form of nonlinearity is
likely to play only a minor role in our analysis.
3.2 Reduced-form estimates
The empirical analysis is complicated by the fact that it is not possible to recover all structural
parameters of the model from the estimates of the central bank Euler equation. In particular,
the preference parameters α and γ are not identiﬁed. A simple transformation of the model
9that confronts directly the issue involves the linearization of the exponential terms in (5) by
means of a ﬁrst-order Taylor series expansion. We solve the resulting expression for it and
prior to GMM estimation we replace expectations with realized values. As customary in the
empirical studies, we introduce a lagged dependent variable to capture interest rate smoothing
for which a number of explanations are provided in the literature (see Woodford, 1999, Sack
and Wieland, 2000, and Castelnuovo, 2003).6 We estimate the following policy rule:
it =( 1− ρ)
h
i∗ + c1 (πt − π∗)+c2yt + c3 (πt − π∗)
2 + c4 (yt)
2
i
+ ρit−1 + νt (6)













and the error tems is deﬁned as
νt ≡−(1 − ρ)
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The term in curly brackets is a linear combination of the forecast errors while et is the
remainder of the Taylor series approximation. Thus, νt is orthogonal to any variable in
the information set available at time t − 1.
Equation (6) makes clear that the reaction function parameters can only be interpreted as
convolutions of the coeﬃcients representing policy makers’ preferences and those describing
the structure of the economy. Nevertheless, the estimates of the policy rule can now identify
the asymmetric preferences and - up to an additional assumption discussed below - α =2 c3/c1
and γ =2 c4/c2. The feedback coeﬃcients c3 and c4 embody the relevant information such that
the joint restriction c3 = c4 =0with c1 6=0and c2 6=0implies α = γ =0 . Hence, testing the
hypothesis H0
0 : c3 = c4 =0in (6) is equivalent to testing the hypothesis H0 : α = γ =0in (5).
Under the null of a linear reaction function, which fully corresponds to the null of symmetric
preferences, the statistics has an asymptotic χ2 distribution with as many degrees of freedom
as the number of restrictions, and it can be successfully evaluated through a standard Wald
test.
In the absence of further assumptions our method only identiﬁes the structural parameter
on output gap asymmetry, γ, but neither the one on inﬂation, α, nor the target π∗, separately.
6Interestingly enough, a policy rule with no interest rate smoothing (estimates not reported but available
upon request) delivers an even stronger evidence of nonlinearity. It follows that the speciﬁcation adopted in
this paper minimizes, if any, the degree of asymmetries. This observation deserves independent attention.
10As the focus of our analysis is on asymmetric preferences, we choose to ﬁxav a l u ef o rπ∗.
Speciﬁcally, we conduct a grid search in the 1% neighborhood of the subsample inﬂation
mean, which is 4.5% for the pre- and 2.8% for the post-1979 period respectively, and we
select the value that provides the best ﬁt. Moreover, as restricting i∗ appears beneﬁcial for
the convergence of the optimization algorithm, we assume that the subsample average of the
interest rate provides a reasonable approximation for the target.
Table 1 reports the GMM estimates of the interest rate rule (6) for the baseline case, which
corresponds to the CBO output gap and PCE inﬂation. The squared output gap term, c4,
is highly signiﬁcant over the pre-Volcker regime in the second column but loses most of its
explanatory power during the later period in the third column. The squared inﬂation term,
c3, appears relatively more relevant in the post-Volcker sample, though it is never statistically
diﬀerent from zero at the 5% signiﬁcance level.
The estimates of the asymmetric preferences parameters are recovered from the feedback
coeﬃcients and the standard errors are computed using the delta method. Interestingly, α
and γ take the expected signs and, in accord to the reduced-form estimates, the asymmetric
preference on output is the signiﬁcant parameter before 1979.7 Speciﬁcally, a 0.3 estimate
of γ implies on impact a 75 point basis cut of the interest rate in response to a negative 2%
output gap but only a 42 point basis rise in response to a positive 2% gap. By contrast, after
1982 both coeﬃcients become of limited importance and the Wald statistics in the second but
last row indicates that the null hypothesis of symmetric preferences is not rejected at the 5%
signiﬁcance level, although it is rejected at the 10% level.
Finally, in order to gauge the forecasting advantages of the nonlinear (as opposed to
the linear) monetary policy rule, we perform a version of the Diebold and Mariano (1995)
test, which is designed to detect any diﬀerence in the predictive accuracy of two competing
forecasts. To this end, we ﬁrst compute the dynamically simulated ﬁtted values of the two
models and then we calculate the corresponding root-mean-squared error (RMSE) over both
sub-samples. The RMSE of the linear model is 0.96 in the pre-Volcker period and 0.65 in the
post-Volcker period, while the values of the nonlinear model are 0.78 and 0.63, respectively.
The Diebold-Mariano test rejects the null hypothesis of no diﬀerence in the accuracy of the
7The results are robust to letting the pre-Volcker sample begin in 1966:1 when the Federal funds rate ﬁrst
traded consistently above the discount rate.
11two speciﬁcations only during the pre-1979 regime, and it thus corroborates the results of the
Wald tests for the presence of asymmetric preferences.
3.3 Robustness checks
We assess now the robustness of our ﬁndings to alternative measures of inﬂation and output
gap, and to diﬀerent normalizations of the ortoghonality condition. Table 2 reports the
estimates obtained using, everything equals, the rate of change in the GDP deﬂator as measure
of inﬂation. The squared terms line up with those in Table 1 and translate into meaningful
preference parameters. Speciﬁcally, the coeﬃcient on output gap, γ, always takes a negative
sign and is signiﬁcant only during the pre-Volcker era, while the coeﬃcient on inﬂation, α,
is never statistically diﬀerent from zero. Lastly, the Wald statistics conﬁrm that asymmetric
preferences matter before 1979, but not after 1982.
We re-estimate the policy rule (6) using the baseline inﬂation and the Hodrick-Prescott
ﬁltered output. The results are shown in Table 3 and they bear out those from the previous
tables. A signiﬁcant, negative value of the feedback coeﬃcient c4 over the ﬁrst sub-sample
maps into a signiﬁcant, negative value of the asymmetric preference on output, whereas no
asymmetry is detected for inﬂation. Once more, the null hypothesis of symmetric preferences
is rejected only during the pre-Volcker regime.
3.4 Structural estimates
One econometric issue we must confront with is that, in small samples, nonlinear GMM may be
sensitive to the normalization of the orthogonality conditions (see Fuhrer, Moore and Schuh,
1995). Moreover, speciﬁc parameterizations of the central bank Euler equation may allow us
to draw direct inference on the structural parameters α and γ. To address these issues, we
rearrange the targeting rule in two alternative forms that we view as most natural for the
problem at hand. To keep consistency with the reduced-form speciﬁcation, we introduce a



































The latter speciﬁcations make it possible to estimate α and γ directly, and since these are
the structural parameters of the model, we refer to the values inferred upon (7) and (8) as
structural estimates.
An advantage of these normalizations relative to the reduced-form (6) is that they do not
implicitly impose a non-zero value for the weight on the interest rate level stabilization µ.
Moreover, to the extent that the inﬂation level and the output gap level signiﬁcantly enter
the central bank policy rule, as they virtually do in all empirical literature, the reduced-
form coeﬃcient on the interest rate gap (it − i∗) is informative about µ such that a positive,




λϕ) implies a positive, signiﬁcant value for µ.
While it is not possible to identify this policy preference parameter, we can evaluate whether
it is statistically diﬀerent from zero and since the test is performed on the convolution rather
than on µ directly, we refer to it as a t-type test.
We estimate α and γ using nonlinear GMM and the set of instruments, zt−1, which includes
the measures of inﬂation and output gap in the baseline case. The reduced-form coeﬃcients
are recovered from the estimates of the conditions (7) and (8) while the standard errors are
computed using the delta method. The results for the ﬁrst and the second normalization are
reported in Table 4 and Table 5 respectively.
The structural estimates conﬁrm, by and large, the reduced-form evidence. The implied
cis( i =1 , 2, 3 and 4) are in most cases not statistically diﬀerent from the estimates of the
previous tables and they provide empirical support for the presence of asymmetric preferences.
The squared variables do never have explanatory power with the exception of the output gap
in the pre-Volcker sample, whose estimate, c4, is negative and signiﬁcant. The structural
parameter α is never statistically diﬀerent from zero whereas the signiﬁcant values of γ over
the ﬁrst sample are in line with the reduced-form estimates. In accord with the results of the
previous tables, the joint null of symmetric central bank preferences, which is now directly
tested on α and γ, is rejected before but not after 1979. Lastly, the t-type statistics for the null
hypothesis µ =0indicate that the central bank penalizes also the ﬂuctuations of the interest
rate level and therefore they validate the restriction implicitly imposed by the reduced-form
13representation (6).
3.5 Discussion
It is useful at this point to compare our estimates with the results from some recent studies
that also focus on the policy regime shift of 1979. Clarida, Galí and Gertler (2000) estimate a
forward-looking linear reaction function for the pre-Volcker period and report values of 0.68 for
the coeﬃcient on inﬂation (s.e.=0 .06)a n d0.28 for the coeﬃcient on CBO output (s.e.=0 .08).
Their estimates suggest that neglecting the squared output gap, which signiﬁcantly enters
our empirical speciﬁcation with a negative sign, introduces a downward bias in the linear
estimate.8 Turning to the nonlinear speciﬁcations, Dolado, Maria-Dolores and Ruge-Murcia
(2004) use a Clarida, Galí and Gertler-type of rule augmented with a generated regressor for
the conditional variance of inﬂation and ﬁnd no evidence for this form of nonlinearity. Kim,
Osborn and Sensier (2004) use a semi-parametric method of estimation and show that only
the asymmetry over the output gap has been sizable.
The post-Volcker estimates of the parameters on the inﬂation level and the output gap
level are not statistically diﬀerent from the values reported in Clarida, Galí and Gertler (2000),
and therefore they conﬁrm a limited role for nonlinearity during the last two decades. These
results are consistent with those in Kim, Osborne and Sensier (2004) while they are only
marginally so with those in Dolado, Maria-Dolores and Ruge-Murcia (2004). The absence of
an output gap objective in the latter study however seems a natural candidate to explain the
diﬀerence. Lastly, we line up with earlier contributions in that the coeﬃcient on the inﬂation
level becomes bigger than one moving from the pre- to the post-1979 period.
4T h e a v e r a g e i n ﬂation bias
The estimates of the previous section support the notion of a novel inﬂation bias due to Cukier-
man (2002). In the presence of an asymmetric objective over the output gap and uncertainty
about the state of the economy, the monetary authorities face an incentive to respond more
aggressively to output contractions of a given amount than to output expansions of the same
magnitude. The reason is that the expected marginal beneﬁt of a policy intervention is convex
in the output gap, implying that to satisfy the Euler equation and stimulate future aggregate
8This result holds true also for the alternative measures of inﬂation and output gap.
14demand the policy makers keep on average the interest rate low. As the private sector cor-
rectly anticipates such an incentive, the precautionary stance of the monetary policy generates
a systematic boost in inﬂation expectations even though, unlike in Barro and Gordon (1983),
the central bank targets output at potential.9
4.1 A model-based measure of the inﬂation mean
This section proposes a simple strategy to measure the asymmetric preferences induced inﬂa-
tion bias, which is deﬁned as the diﬀerence between the model-based inﬂa t i o nm e a na n dt h e
inﬂation target. The resulting expression is isomorphic to the one that Surico (2003) derives
as the diﬀerence between the optimal policies under discretion and under commitment using
an asymmetric central bank objective and a Lucas aggregate supply.
On the basis of the empirical results presented in the previous section, we impose the
restriction α =0into the ﬁrst order condition of the central bank optimization problem (5).
The corresponding augmented targeting rule writes
Et−1{[−(it − i∗)+( 1− ρ)(c1 (πt − π∗)+c2yt + c4y2
t)+ρ(it−1 − i∗)]zt−1} =0 (9)
where the parameters are written in reduced-form for expositional convenience and zt−1 cor-
responds to the instrument set.
The maintained assumption that the target i∗ equals the sample mean of the interest rate,
combined with the empirically grounded restriction of a symmetric preference over inﬂation
allow us to uniquely identify the inﬂation target. To see this, notice that the constant in the
above expression becomes nothing but the convolution (−c1π∗).10 The inﬂation mean and its











9In the theory of consumption, a precautionary motive emerges from the interaction between non-quadratic
preferences and labor income risks such as to generate above-average saving rates in periods of high uncertainty.
As shown by Kimball (1990), a suﬃcient condition for a precautionary saving is that the expected marginal
utility be convex in consumption. Analogously here, the above-average inﬂation comes from the interaction
between an asymmetric central bank objective and uncertainty about the state of the economy. Moreover, as
the expected marginal loss is concave in the output gap, this motive can be thought as a precautionary demand
for expansions.
10It is worth noticing that the assumption on the interest rate target should bias, if any, the inﬂation target
towards the sample mean of inﬂation. This suggests that our estimates are likely to understate the contribution
of the asymmetric preferences induced bias to the actual mean of US inﬂation.
15where we have used the fact that the output gap has an unconditional distribution with zero
mean and variance σ2
y.
The average inﬂation bias arises here because policy preferences are asymmetric with
respect to the output gap rather than because the desired level of output is above potential
like in Barro and Gordon (1983). The distortion increases with the degree of asymmetry,
and to the extent that the penalty associated to an output contraction is larger than the
penalty associated to an output expansion of the same size, the model predicts γ<0.A sλ
and k are positive, the diﬀerence between the model-based inﬂation mean and the inﬂation
target represents an inﬂation bias rather than a deﬂation bias. When γ is equal to zero,
the expected marginal beneﬁt of a policy intervention becomes linear and the inﬂation bias
disappears together with the precautionary motive.
The average inﬂation bias is proportional to the variance of the output gap and, as shown
by the ﬁrst equality in (10), it is inversely related to the inﬂation slope of the targeting rule
(9). Hence, the model is rich enough to confront the explanatory power of a change in the
asymmetric preference parameter over the output gap, γ, with two alternative interpretations
of the behavior of US inﬂation. The ﬁr s ti sas h i f ti nt h er e s p o n s et ot h ei n ﬂation level as
captured by c1. The second is a diﬀerence in the variance of the shocks as proxied by σ2
y.
4.2 Measuring the bias
We estimate equation (9) using GMM with a four lag Newey-West estimate of the covariance
matrix. The measures of inﬂation and output gaps and the instrumental variables refer to
the baseline case. The only diﬀerence relative to Table 1 is that, in line with the restriction
c3 =0 , the four lags of the squared inﬂation are not included here as instruments. The
r e s u l t sa r es h o w ni nT a b l e6a n dt h e yt u r no u tt ob es u ﬃciently close to those reported in
t h ep r e v i o u st a b l e st h a tw ed on o tc o m m e n tf u r t h er. The restrictions discussed above allows
us to identify the inﬂation target, which is found to move from 3.61% during the 1960s and
1970s to a statistically lower 2.77% during the last two decades. Interestingly enough, this
result contrasts with most of the empirical literature on monetary policy rules that, neglecting
asymmetric preferences on the output gap and therefore imposing a linear reaction function,
usually ﬁnd a diﬀerence in π∗ over subsamples of two-to-three percentage points.






, and the delta method to obtain the standard errors. Table 7 displays the results.
The average inﬂation bias, which is reported in the second row, is sizable and statistically
diﬀerent from zero only in the pre-Volcker period. The model-based inﬂa t i o nm e a ni nt h e
fourth row conﬁrms that we eﬀectively decompose the actual inﬂation mean into a target and
a bias argument. Moreover, a shift in the policy preferences on output stabilization appears
to account for a larger fraction of the diﬀerence in the sub-samples mean of inﬂation relative
to a reduction in the implicit inﬂation target.
The results in Table 6 and Table 7 suggest that while a diﬀerent interest rate response
to the inﬂation level, as described by the rise of c1, and a more favorable macroeconomic
environment, as summarized by the decline in the standard deviation of the output gap, have
also played a role, a change in the policy preference on output from asymmetric to symmetric
appears crucial to account for the observation that US inﬂation has been on average higher
during the 1960s and 1970s than during the 1980s and 1990s.
5C o n c l u s i o n s
The contribution of this paper is twofold. At the theoretical level, it derives the analytical so-
lution of the central bank optimization problem when the policy preferences are asymmetric in
both inﬂation and output gaps, and the monetary transmission mechanism is New-Keynesian.
The speciﬁcation of the policy objectives is general enough to nest the quadratic form as a
special case and therefore it translates into a potentially nonlinear targeting rule. This fea-
ture forms the basis of our hypothesis testing for the presence of asymmetric preferences as it
allows to reversely engineer potential evidence of nonlinearities in the reaction function into
evidence of asymmetries in the policy objective.
At the empirical level, this paper shows that US monetary policy can be eﬀectively char-
acterized by a nonlinear policy rule only during the pre-Volcker regime, with the interest rate
response to the state of the business cycle being the dominant type of nonlinearity. In par-
ticular, the Fed appears to have historically attached a larger weight to output contractions
than to output expansions of the same magnitude such as to induce an average inﬂation bias
of 1.11%. The latter can account for a sizable fraction of the inﬂation rise observed during
the 1960s and 1970s. These ﬁndings are robust across alternative measures of inﬂation and
output gap, as well as across alternative estimation strategies.
17Altogether, this paper provides empirical support for asymmetric preferences and suggests
some caution about using symmetric loss functions as a guide to policy analysis. Promising
strands of the literature have recently emphasized that political pressures, labor market fric-
tions and heterogeneity in portfolio holdings can make the costs of business ﬂuctuations and
inﬂation variation asymmetric. Along these lines, a stimulating avenue for future research is
to derive an utility-based welfare function within richer models of the business cycle in order
to provide a formal microfoundation for an asymmetric central bank objective.
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Table 1: Reduced-form Estimates 
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J(19) p-value  .960 .874 
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Notes: Standard errors using a four lag Newey-West covariance matrix are reported in 
brackets. Inflation is measured as the change in the personal consumption deflator and 
the output gap is obtained using the CBO potential output. The instrument set includes 
four lags of inflation, squared inflation, output gap, squared output gap, the fed funds rate 
and the rate of change in the gdp deflator. The asymmetric preference parameters are 
computed as α=2c3/c1 and γ=2c4/c2 while the standard errors are obtained using the delta 
method. W(n) refers to the Wald statistics of the test for n parameter restrictions, which is 
distributed as a χ
2(n) under the joint null hypothesis c3=c4=0. The latter is equivalent to 
the original null of symmetric central bank preferences, α=γ=0.  J(m) refers to the 
statistics of Hansen’s test for m overidentifying restrictions which is distributed as a 
χ
2(m) under the null hypothesis of valid overidentifying restrictions. The superscript ** 
and * denote the rejection of the null hypothesis that the true coefficient is zero at the 1 
percent and 5 percent significance levels, respectively.   23
Table 2: Reduced-form Estimates 
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F-stat p-value  .00/.00 .00/.00 
J(19) p-value  .959 .985 
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Notes: Standard errors using a four lag Newey-West covariance matrix are reported in 
brackets. Inflation is measured as the rate change in the gdp deflator and the output gap is 
obtained using the CBO potential output. The instrument set includes four lags of 
inflation, squared inflation, output gap, squared output gap, the fed funds rate and 
personal consumption inflation. The asymmetric preference parameters are computed as 
α=2c3/c1 and γ=2c4/c2 while the standard errors are obtained using the delta method. 
W(n) refers to the Wald statistics of the test for n parameter restrictions, which is 
distributed as a χ
2(n) under the joint null hypothesis c3=c4=0. The latter is equivalent to 
the original null of symmetric central bank preferences, α=γ=0. F-stat refers to the 
statistics of the hypothesis testing for weak instruments relative to inflation and 
output gap, respectively. J (m) refers to the statistics of Hansen’s test for m 
overidentifying restrictions which is distributed as a χ
2(m) under the null hypothesis of 
valid overidentifying restrictions. The superscript ** and * denote the rejection of the 
null hypothesis that the true coefficient is zero at the 1 percent and 5 percent significance 
levels, respectively.   24
Table 3: Reduced-form Estimates 
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F-stat p-value  .00/.00 .00/.00 
J(19) p-value  .969 .895 
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Notes: Standard errors using a four lag Newey-West covariance matrix are reported in 
brackets. Inflation is measured as changes in the personal consumption deflator and the 
output gap is obtained with the Hodrick-Prescott filter (smoothing parameter = 1600). 
The instrument set includes four lags of inflation, squared inflation, output gap, squared 
output gap, the fed funds rate and gdp inflation. The asymmetric preference parameters 
are computed as α=2c3/c1 and γ=2c4/c2 while the standard errors are obtained using the 
delta method. W(n) refers to the Wald statistics of the test for n parameter restrictions, 
which is distributed as a χ
2(n) under the joint null hypothesis c3=c4=0. The latter is 
equivalent to the original null of symmetric central bank preferences, α=γ=0. F-stat 
refers to the statistics of the hypothesis testing for weak instruments relative to 
inflation and output gap, respectively. J(m) refers to the statistics of Hansen’s test for m 
overidentifying restrictions which is distributed as a χ
2(m) under the null hypothesis of 
valid overidentifying restrictions. The superscript ** and * denote the rejection of the 
null hypothesis that the true coefficient is zero at the 1 percent and 5 percent significance 
levels, respectively.   25
Table 4: Structural Estimates 
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W(2) p-value  .000 .530 
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Notes: This table reports the nonlinear GMM estimates of the structural parameters α and 
γ. The estimates of the reduced-form coefficients are recovered from the estimates of the 
structural parameters while the standard errors are computed using the delta method. 
Inflation, output gap and the instrument set zt-1 correspond to the baseline measures 
described in the notes to Table 1. The t-type test refers to the null hypothesis (µ/κϕ) =0. 
W(n) refers to the Wald statistics of the test for n parameter restrictions, which is 
distributed as a χ
2(n) under the joint null hypothesis α=γ=0. J(m) refers to the statistics of 
Hansen’s test for m overidentifying restrictions which is distributed as a χ
2(m) under the 
null hypothesis of valid overidentifying restrictions. The superscript ** and * denote the 
rejection of the null hypothesis that the true coefficient is zero at the 1 percent and 5 
percent significance levels, respectively.   26
Table 5: Structural Estimates 
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W(2) p-value  .000 .423 
J(19) p-value  .949 .876 
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Notes: This table reports the nonlinear GMM estimates of the structural parameters α and 
γ. The estimates of the reduced-form coefficients are recovered from the estimates of the 
structural parameters while the standard errors are computed using the delta method. 
Inflation, output gap and the instrument set zt-1 correspond to the baseline measures 
described in the notes to Table 1. The t-type test refers to the null hypothesis (µ/λϕ) =0. 
W(n) refers to the Wald statistics of the test for n parameter restrictions, which is 
distributed as a χ
2(n) under the joint null hypothesis α=γ=0. J(m) refers to the statistics of 
Hansen’s test for m overidentifying restrictions which is distributed as a χ
2(m) under the 
null hypothesis of valid overidentifying restrictions. The superscript ** and * denote the 
rejection of the null hypothesis that the true coefficient is zero at the 1 percent and 5 
percent significance levels, respectively.   27
Table 6: Inferring the Inflation Target 
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Notes: Standard errors using a four lag Newey-West covariance matrix are reported in 
brackets. Inflation is measured as the change in the personal consumption deflator and 
the output gap is obtained using the CBO potential output. The instrument set includes 
four lags of inflation, output gap, squared output gap, the fed funds rate and the rate of 
change in the gdp deflator. The asymmetric preference parameter on inflation is 
restricted to zero while the one on the output gap is computed as γ=2c4/c2. The standard 
errors are obtained using the delta method. J(m) refers to the statistics of Hansen’s test 
for  m overidentifying restrictions which is distributed as a χ
2(m) under the null 
hypothesis of valid overidentifying restrictions. The superscript ** and * denote the 
rejection of the null hypothesis that the true coefficient is zero at the 1 percent and 5 
percent significance levels, respectively.   28
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Notes: Standard errors in brackets. The average inflation bias, which is defined as 
the difference between the model-based average inflation and the inflation target, is 
recovered from the estimates of the interest rate reaction function reported in Table 6 
as (-c4 σy
2/c1). The standard errors are obtained using the delta method. The superscript 
** and * denote the rejection of the null hypothesis that the true coefficient is zero at 
the 1 percent and 5 percent significance levels, respectively.   29  30
Figure 2: Baseline Series 
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